defines an IPv6 extension header called "Routing Header", identified by a Next Header value of 43 in the immediately preceding header. A particular Routing Header subtype denoted as "Type 0" is also defined. Type 0 Routing Headers are referred to as "RH0" in this document.
A single RH0 may contain multiple intermediate node addresses, and the same address may be included more than once in the same RH0. This allows a packet to be constructed such that it will oscillate between two RH0-processing hosts or routers many times. This allows a stream of packets from an attacker to be amplified along the path between two remote routers, which could be used to cause congestion along arbitrary remote paths and hence act as a denial-of-service mechanism. 88-fold amplification has been demonstrated using this technique [CanSecWest07].
This attack is particularly serious in that it affects the entire path between the two exploited nodes, not only the nodes themselves or their local networks. Analogous functionality may be found in the IPv4 source route option, but the opportunities for abuse are greater with RH0 due to the ability to specify many more intermediate node addresses in each packet.
The severity of this threat is considered to be sufficient to warrant deprecation of RH0 entirely. A side-effect is that this also eliminates benign RH0 use-cases; however, such applications may be facilitated by future Routing Header specifications. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Deprecation of RH0
IPv6 nodes MUST NOT process RH0 in packets whose destination address in the IPv6 header is an address assigned to them. Such packets MUST be processed according to the behaviour specified in Section 4.4 of [RFC2460] for a datagram which includes an unrecognised Routing Type value, namely:
If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type is identified by the Next Header field in the Routing header.
If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's Source Address, pointing to the unrecognised Routing Type.
IPv6 implementations are no longer required to implement RH0 in any way.
Operations

Ingress Filtering
It is to be expected that it will take some time before all IPv6 nodes are updated to remove support for RH0. Some of the uses of RH0 described in [CanSecWest07] can be mitigated using ingress filtering, as recommended in [RFC2827] and [RFC3704] .
A site security policy intended to protect against attacks using RH0 SHOULD include the implementation of ingress filtering at the site border.
Firewall Policy
Blocking Firewall policy intended to protect against packets containing RH0 MUST NOT simply filter all traffic with a routing header; it must be possible to disable forwarding of type 0 traffic without blocking other types of routing headers. In addition, the default configuration MUST permit forwarding of traffic using a RH other than 0.
Security Considerations
The purpose of this document is to deprecate a feature of IPv6 which has been shown to have undesirable security implications. Specific examples of vulnerabilities which are facilitated by the availability of RH0 can be found in [CanSecWest07]. In particular, RH0 provides a mechanism for traffic amplification, which might be used as a denialof-service attack. A description of this functionality can be found in Section 1.
IANA Considerations
The IANA registry "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters" should be updated to reflect that variant 0 of IPv6 header-type 43 ("Routing Header") is deprecated.
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